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Summary 
This paper assesses the consistency, efficiency and viability of 
the economic system implicit and explicit in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-
Four. The first section illustrates the main features of Orwell's model: 
(its geopolitics, the convergence to a single system, ownership, planning, 
markets and prices, information, statistics, resources, technology, trade, 
public policy, permanent warfare) and its internal dynamics. The second 
section provides a critique, based on the implausibility of the whole if 
not of the parts of the model, the uni-dimensionality and indivisibility 
of Orwell's notion of power, the informational inefficiency of the system, 
the unwarranted extension of the results of the model to a three-players 
game between the superstates, technological regress, the lack of micro-
foundations, the economic position of .Puter Party.members, the dehumani-
sation of the working class. The third section concludes, on the strength 
of these points, that Orwell's "oligarchic collectivism" does not stand 
the strain of close scrutiny as a feasible economic system, and remains 
simply a catalogue of all the things that could go wrong in a modern 
society, though not at the same time in the same society, let alone in 
all societies. 
A CRITIQUE OF ORWELL'S OLIGARCHIC COLLECTIVISM 
AS AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM * 
George Orwel1's account of social life at an indeterminate date 
circa 1984 has anticipated correctly a number of detailed developments 
which have occurred since 1949 when he published his book : from eaves-
dropping techniques to mass media manipulation, from two-way visual 
communications to computer-written literature, from obfuscating official 
language to decimalisation. Gradually Orwell's book has turned from a 
literary artefact with a political charge into the forecast of a politi-
cal and economic scenario which is ~ow regarded as plausible, likely and 
even partly realized. This process of public acclimatisation to the 
danger of Orwell's horror parable coming true has accelerated simply 
with the approach of the fated calendar year, as if the very fact of 
entering 1984 somehow represented the partial fulfilment of a dreaded 
prophecy. Reprinted by the million copies in dozens of editions and 
languages,the book is labelled as a "warning for us all" : "Now in the 
eighties- our present and Orwell's brilliantly imagined future- his 
vision of brutalised and manipulated humanity is still gripping and 
still supremely relevant" (from the cover of the Penguin edition, 1983, 
to which page references are made here). 
* Paper presented at the Working Group on Comparative Economic Systems, 
EUI, on 11 October 1984. I am very grateful to Phil Hanson for 
commenting on an earlier draft. 
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The plausibility of Orwell's "oligarchical collectivism" (Part 2, 
Chapter 8, p. 163; 2.8.163 in the shorter notation used hereafter) as a 
political system has been strengthened by the observed growth and stabi-
lity of totalitarian regimes, the widespread diffusion of state capita-
lism and one-party systems, the mysterious succession of dying octua-
genarians to Big Brother's immortal high office. But the economic system 
implicit and explicit in Nineteen eighty-four has no such prima facie 
grounds for credibility; its consistency, efficiency and viability 
deserve closer scrutiny. This paper assesses the economics of Orwell's 
vision as either fantasy or anticipation. 
I. ORWELL'S SYSTEM 
Geopolitics. In Orwell's story in the mid-nineteen-fifties, after 
a global atomic conflict during which some hundreds of bombs were 
dropped, ~he world was split - or rather regrouped - into three great 
super-states. Eurasia was formed by th~. absorption. of Europe by Russia; 
it "comprises the whole of the northern part of the European and Asiatic 
land mass, from Portugal to the Bering Strait" (2.9.164). Oceania was 
formed by the absorption of the British Empire by the United States; it 
"comprises the Americas, the Atlantic islands including the British 
Isles now rechristened Airstrip One , Australasia, and the Southern 
portion of Africa"; "Eastasia, smaller than the others and with a less 
definite western frontier, comprises China and the countries to the 
south of it, the Japanese islands and a large but fluctuating portion of 
Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet"; it emerged as a distinct unit after 
another decade of confused fighting (Ibidem). 
Convergence. 
-:; 
By 1984 political and economic systems in the three 
superstates have completely converged to a virtually identical system: 
"In Oceania the prevailing philosophy is called IngSoc (a term coined 
around 1960, standing for English Socialism, 1.3.37], in Eurasia it is 
called Neo-Bolshevism, and in Eastasia it is called by a Chinese name 
- 3 -
usually translated as Death-Worship, but perhaps better rendered as 
Obliteration of the Self ... Actually the three philosophies are barely 
distinguishable, and the social systems which they support are not 
dis~inguishable at all". "The conditions of life in all three super-
states are very much the same" (2.9.171). 
Ownership and social strata. Means of production and durable 
consumption goods are formally the object of collective ownership. 
Private capitalists have been expropriated and private property has been 
formally abolished, except for petty personal belongings. Formal 
ownership is vested in the Party, which collectively owns everything. 
There are three strata of economic agents, with diversified access to 
economic power and real consumption, according to their connection with 
th.e Party; the Inner Party, or the "brain" of the state, making up in 
Oceania 2% of the population; the Outer Party, or the "hands" of the 
state, making up 13% of the Oceanian population, and the proletarians, 
or "proles", making up the remaining 85%. Economic power is vested in a 
hierarchical oligarchy that goes tgrough the motions of renewing itself 
through meritocratic processes but is effectively selfperpetuating 
(2.9.179). 
Planning. The economy is centrally planned. The Ministry of 
Plenty (Miniplenty for short) is responsible for economic affairs 
(1.1.9; the other Ministries are those of Truth, Peace, and Love, 
respectively in charge of media manipulation, war and police). Mini-
plenty operates a system of Three-Year Plans, which started in mid-1958 
(in fact the fourth quarter of 1983 is also the sixth quarter of the 
Ninth Three-Year Plan, 1.4.38). Planning is in physical terms; great 
importance is attached to fulfilment and overfulfilment of plans; 
priority is attached to armaments and heavy industry (pig iron, 1.1.8), 
while consumption levels even of necessities are deliberately held down 
"' (2.9.168). Central control is tight even on minor aspects of economic 
life ("Repairs, except what you could do for yourself, had to be sanc-
tioned by remote committees which were liable to hold up even the 
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mending of a window pane for two years", 1.2.22, which reveals both high 
centralisation and lack of concern for consumption). Planning mobilises 
resources ("the battle for production", 1.5.54). "The recurrent economic 
crises of past times •.• are not now permitted to happen" (2.9.178-179) 
and there appears to be full employment of labour. However, actual 
outputs, at least of consumption goods, always fall grossly short of 
official forecasts (1.4.38). 
Information. Everybody has a number (Winston Smith's is 6079). 
Central authorities, symbolically personified by Big Brother, monitor 
individual behaviour and communicate directly with individuals by means 
of telescreens. However, Inner Party members can turri their telescreens 
off ('"Yes', said O'Brien, 'we can turn it off. We have that privi-
lege"',' 2. 8 .150) and the great majority of proles do not have tele-
screens (1.7.65; "I never had one of those things", 1.8.87). There is 
no "real intercommunication between one part of Oceania and another" 
(1.8.77); there are no directories of any kind (2.6.140). The syste-
matic shortfall of actual output with r:spect to plans is concealed and 
eliminated by the retrospective adjustment of official figures so as to 
agree with official forecasts (1.4.38). If promises and even "catego-
rical ple.dges" are reneged, records are subsequently modified as to 
indicate a premonition or warning of actual events. This process of 
continuous alteration is applied "to every kind of literature or documen-
tation which might conceivably hold any political or ideological signifi-
cance" (1.4.39). 
Statistics "were just as much a fantasy in their original version 
as in their rectified version. A great deal of the time you were 
expected to make them up out of your head" (1.4.40); for instance 
Miniplenty's qua~terly plan for boots had been of 145 million pairs; 
actual output was given as 62 million, so in Minitrue Winston Smith 
retrospectively rectified the planned figure to 57 million as to allow 
for overfulfilment, but in any case all these figures had "not even the 
kind of connection with reality that is contained in a direct lie", 
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nobody knew or cared how many boots were being produced, while perhaps 
half the population went barefoot and an astronomical number of boots 
were produced on paper in a shadow world in which even the date of the 
yea:r had become uncertain (" ••• (if it was 1984) ••• ", 1.3.34). "Day and 
night the telescreens bruised your ears with statistics proving that 
people today had more food, more clothes, better houses, better recrea-
tions - that they lived longer, worked shorter hours, were better, 
healthier, stronger, happier, more intelligent, better educated, than 
the people of fifty years ago. Not a word of it could ever be proved or 
disproved" (1.7.68). 
Standard of living. If consumption trends could be concealed and 
falsified, actual levels were directly and instantaneously perceived and 
could not be. The standard of living varies for the three strata: 
members of the Inner Party have direct access to generous allocations of 
necessities and luxuries by virtue of membership, as well as receiving 
cash for market transactions; they live in a special district, in 
"richness and spaciousness", surro.~nded by unfamiliar smells of good 
food and tobacco, silent and incredibly rapid lifts, white-jacketed 
servants, in a state of virtual saturation of needs (2.8.152). Outer 
Party members are considerably worse off, consume cheap and inadequate 
surrogates and have no access to luxuries. An Outer Party member receives 
3,000 clothing coupons annually, and a suit of pyjamas is 600 (1.3.32); 
his regulation lunch consists of a metal pannikin of pinkish-grey stew, 
a hunk of bread, a cube of cheese, a mug of milkless Victory coffee and 
one saccharin tablet (1.5.47). Tobacco is rationed to 100 grammes a 
week (1.5.54); chocolate to 20 grammes (reduced from 30 grammes, 1.2.27). 
Electric power in the home is cut off during daylight (1.1.7); lights 
are turned off at 23.30 hours. The quality of available goods is low 
and deteriorating (coarse soap, bread, bad gin, cigarettes); surrogates 
are inadequate (blackberry leaves for tea; saccharin for sugar); simple 
essential goods are in short supply, such as razor blades, buttons, 
darning wool. Advertising is not commercial, only political; plain 
white labels are stuck to the only brand available, named after Victory. 
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Simple luxuries such as wine, oranges and lemons, are now forgotten ("'I 
wonder what a lemon was', he added inconsequently. 'I have seen oranges. 
They are a kind of round yellow fruit with a thick skin.'", 2.5.130; 
"'It is .called wine', said O'Brien with a faint smile. 'You will have 
read about it in books, no doubt. Not much of it gets to the Outer 
Party, I am afraid'." (2.8.152). Outside the Inner Party district the 
housing stock is in a poor state of repair: flaking plaster, burst 
pipes, leaking roofs, malfunctioning heating systems and lifts (1.2.22 
and 1.1.7). Proles are worse off than Outer Party members, but are 
subject to fewer economic and political restrictions (unlike Outer Party 
members, they can divorce, indulge in promiscuity, consume pornographic 
products, transact in black markets, and escape direct monitoring of 
their lives; they are supposed to drink beer instead of gin, but have no 
difficulty in obtaining it). Recorded increase in the average standard 
of living in 1983 was officially said to be 20% (1.5.54), but "always in 
your stomach and your skin there was a sort of protest, a feeling that 
you had been cheated of something that you had a right to" (1.5.54). 
Markets and prices. In spite of privileged access to consumption 
by groups, and widespread rationing, cash transactions also took place 
for wages and consumption goods. Oceania's currency is the dollar; at 
1984 prices a large nip of Victory gin is $0.10 (1.5.46), a high quality 
writing book $2.50 (1.1.11), an antique glass paperweight which in the 
midfifties would have fetched £8 now is priced substantially less at $4 
(1.8.85); a rented room in the private market is a few dollars a week 
(1.8.86), and a telescreen is "expensive" (1.8.87). The permanent state 
of excess demand is not reflected in official price trends, but there is 
a parallel black market in which scarce goods are redistributed at 
higher prices. "Party members were supposed not to go into ordinary 
shops ('dealing on the free market', it was called), but the rule was 
not strictly kept, because there were various things, such as shoelaces 
and razor blades, which it was impossible to get hold of in any other 
way" (1.1.11; this presumably applied only to Outer Party members, since 
Inner Party members had all they needed). There is also some production 
- 7 -
of goods and services outside the state sector, i.e. a very small scale 
black or second economy, as we would call it today. We are given evidence 
for butter in the countryside (2.2.105; we are not told whether official 
agr~culture is made up of anything other than state farms), retail 
services in the cities ("in one of the poorer quarters there was an open 
market which was generally crowded", 2.3.113) and rented accommodation 
(1.8.86). 
Resources. Human and capital resources have been seriously deple-
ted by war. "The ravages of the atomic war of the nineteen-fifties have 
never been fully repaired" (2.9.166). Subsequent wars are less destruc-
tive, in spite of the universal availability of nuclear weapons; however 
conventional bombing continuously damages the housing stock~ Much of 
social capital is wearing out faster than replacement; investment is 
concentrated in non- productive sectors (armaments); metals are being 
recycled(" .•• of course the metal stuff's mostly been melted down", 
1.8.85). Population has drastically fallen since the mid-fifties, down 
to just over one billion (we know Ehat Oceania's Inner Party members are 
6 million and represent 2% of Oceanian total, which is, therefore, 300 
million, 2.9.179; the three super-states have roughly equivalent econo-
mic size; even including the floating populations of the equatorial 
land, which is about a fifth of the total, world population cannot be 
much out of 1.1 billion). Demographic growth is restricted by the 
Party's policy of sexual restraint and overall attitude to marriage and 
family (1.4.45; 1.6.60-61, on the Party's attempt at killing the sex 
instinct). 
Technology. All major past inventions are credited to the Party, 
from helicopters to aeroplanes and the steam engine (1.8.85 - per se a 
harmless practice). As a whole the world is more primitive than fifty 
years earlier; some sectors have advanced, especially in connection with 
warfare and internal repression, and some new inventions are available 
(such as the novel writing machine used by Julia, whose tasks consisted 
chiefly in running and servicing a powerful but tricky electric motor, 
2.3.115). But experiment and invention have largely stopped (2.9.166), 
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much technical knowledge has been forgotten and regress has taken place; 
fields are now cultivated with horse ploughs (2.9.166-168); since 
warfare is permanent but - in spite of nuclear technology - inconsequen-
tial, ~ven in military matters efficiency is of lesser importance. In 
the past, technical progress by raising productivity undermined the very 
foundations of a hierarchical society, by spreading too widely its 
benefits among the masses; now those benefits are used to raise the war 
effort while maintaining inequality, thus progress does not have this 
adverse side-effect on the oligarchy's long term survival. 
Trade. The three super-states are totally self-sufficient and do 
not engage in trade between themselves. Each of them is large enough to 
have almost everything it requires from within its boundaries, so that 
the competition for raw materials is no longer a matter of life and 
death. Production being geared to internal requirements, the scramble 
for markets is no longer necessary. Thus regions within each state are 
completely integrated and each state ;s totally autarkic (2.9.164-165). 
There are no migrations of labour, only temporary conquest and enslave-
ment of equatorial populations. There are no international loans, or 
financial flows of any kind {presumably old outstanding financial links 
have been liquidated with the nineteenfifties war). Apart from (friendly 
or hostile) military contact there are no direct links between the 
super-states: "War prisoners apart, the average citizen of Oceania never 
sets eyes on a citizen of either Eurasia or Eastasia, and he is forbidden 
the knowledge of foreign languages" ••• "the main frontiers must never be 
crossed by anything except bombs" (2.9.171). 
Public policy. There is no mention of taxation; though "About a 
quarter of one's sal~~y had to be earmarked for voluntary subscriptions"; 
nor is there any mention of banking and credit; every week a Gordo-type 
giant Lottery with large prizes (fictitious, of course) has an important 
place in individual expectations of material improvement (for millions 
it is the principal if not the only reason for remaining alive, 1.8.77). 
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If there were no armaments, the system would be subject to the same 
underconsumptionist tendencies of pre-mid-fifties capitalism; a state of 
permanent warfare provides the necessary outlet (over and above public 
inyestment and the very substantial requirements of secret police and 
mass media manipulation) not only to absorb any excess capacity that 
might remain after the satisfaction of desired consumption expenditure, 
but also to squeeze private consumption in order to deliberately main-
tain the masses in a condition of permanent relative poverty. 
Permanent warfare is therefore regarded as essential to the very 
survival of oligarchic collectivism both as a state-wide and a worldwide 
system. The object of war is only marginally and incidentally the 
conquest of territorial and resource advantage, which even if it occurs 
is known beforehand not to be permanent, because no two allied super-
states can permanently subjugate the third. The primary purpose of war 
is that of destroying surplus labour before its fruits bring about too 
much equality, i.e. of reproducing inequality and therefore keeping the 
structure of society intact. Thus.,. in 1980 Oceania was still at war with 
Eastasia and at peace with Eurasia (2.5.136); then it turned to war with 
Eurasia in alliance with Eastasia (1.3.34), and suddenly, right in the 
middle of 1984 Hate Week, Oceania allies itself again with Eurasia 
against Eastasia. This cyclical pattern replaces the business cycles 
and political cycles of the pre-fifties world, while the system contin-
uously reproduces itself. 
System dynamics. Collectivism and warfare are the solid pillars of 
the oligarchic system envisaged by Orwell. Collectivism provides the 
only secure basis for oligarchy, in that the formal abolition of private 
property protects the few who somehow have hoisted themselves onto a 
position of power from the threat which otherwise would remain to their 
own exclusive enjoyment - and that of their heirs - of the fruits of , 
their property. Warfare prevents the dispossessed majority from impro-
ving their lot relatively to the oligarchy through the better use of 
resources due to higher capacity utilisation or technical progress, by 
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destroying what would otherwise be distributed to their benefit, and 
more. By assumption, or by construction, th.e resulting low-consumption, 
high-inequality, permanent- warfare equilibrium is protected from any 
disturbance. In particular, both the Inner Party members and the proles 
are said to be contented with their lot, i.e. there is no alienation: 
"Winston's greatest pleasure in life was in his work", (1.7.65); while 
the proles are caught in a vicious circle: "Until they become conscious 
they will never rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot 
become conscious" (1.7.65, emphasis in text); left to themselves they 
have reverted to a natural, ancestral pattern of behaviour which makes 
them happier than Outer Party members but keeps them so concerned and 
busy with their private, physical and low grade world as to make them 
easy - animal-like - prey to the long arm of the Party. And in any case 
the concern with subsistence, the response to petty concessions, the 
superior technology of central surveillance, the absence of horizontal 
communication networks, the lack of exogenous shocks from .sudden techni-
cal progress or international relations, load the dice so heavily in 
favour of the oligarchy as to make O'Br~~n's final statement a foregone 
conclusion: "'The proletarians will never revolt, not in a thousand 
years or a million •••• The rule of the Party is forever'" (3.3.225-226). 
II. A CRITIQUE 
The parts and the whole. A major, apparently not yet acknowledged, 
achievement of George Orwell's description of oligarchic collectivism is 
not the anticipation of a future system, but the pioneering understanding 
of some (and some only) of the already existing economic features of the 
Soviet system, which though partly sketched by Hayek and Mises were 
still not fully acknowledged in contemporary Western Sovietological 
.. ~ 
literature to which Orwell had access. Many of the economic traits of 
oligarchic collectivism were already present in the USSR while Orwell 
was writing: clearly drawn social strata, from the Nomenklatura down, 
physical planning, heavy and defence industry priorities; an absence 
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of street maps, telephone directories, and similar sources of social 
information; a barrage of propaganda about material progress; dodgy 
economic statistics, shortages; housing in a poor state of repair, 
priyileged access to goods and services for the upper strata; black 
markets; and a tendency towards technological stagnation. 1 
Some of the economic features of oligarchic collectivism were also 
borrowed from war-time economics, and from the Nazi system; while some 
of the more unpleasant political and human features of Orwell's vision 
were also observable in these and other totalitarian systems of his own 
time. 
It does not follow from the plausibility or even the actual realisa-
tion of some of Orwell's premises, however, that his vision deserves 
credibility, as a picture of the world either as it is or as it will be. 
First, there are essential parts of his picture which have not come true 
and cannot come true because they are evidently implausible, such as the 
triangular international set-up an~ its equilibrium, the elimination of 
independent thought and protest, technical regress, the autarky of the 
super-states. Nazi Germany is gone, and the Soviet Union of 1984 employs 
a large labour force of quite highly educated and well-informed people; 
has made substantial material progress; deals extensively with other 
states, including states with different socio-economic systems, and does 
not require mass poverty and coercion for its functioning. Second, many 
of the essential features of the Orwellian system are actually mutually 
1. I am indebted to Phil Hanson for making this point and providing such 
a comprehensive catalogue of similarities between Orwell's picture and 
the Soviet Union of his own times, as well as of the differences given 
below. 
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incompatible and the system, regardless of its components, is not 
plausible as a whole. 
Intensity versus certainty of power. At several stages during the 
narration Winston Smith questions the "ultimate motive" of the whole 
system: "I understand HOW; I do not understand WHY" (1.7.72; 2.9.185). 
Only towards the end is the question of why posed and answered by the 
Inner Party inquisitor, O'Brien: "The Party seeks power entirely for its 
own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested 
solely in powero Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only 
power, pure power" (3.3.227). It is indeed true that" •.• no one ever 
seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it" (Ibidem), and that, 
as we have seen above, the system gives the certainty of reproducing the 
power ·structure over time. But power here is taken as an absolute, 
single and indivisible object; in fact, if power could be graded in 
intensity, or identified into the components of a multidimensional 
measurement, the oligarchy would have to attach some weight on to a 
suitable measure of power intensity, depending in turn on its own 
"preferences", or "objective function"~· 1 The system outlined by 
Orwell, if it functions as envisaged, can ensure the certain undisturbed 
enjoyment of a given relative inequality position of a given oligarchy, 
but this is not the same thing as "pure power". If the oligarchy is 
interested in its relative size, or its precise relative position of 
unequal privilege (even neglecting the multidimensional difficulties 
associated with a measurement of inequality), or some other measure of 
power intensity, Orwell's system is too crude to deal with this more 
1. Phil Hanson has pointed out that there actually is, in the Soviet 
system, a trade-off between the retention of status and privilege by. the 
oligarchy, on the one~'1\and, and efficiency and technical progres·s on the 
other; when the choice has arisen, status and privilege have been 
preferred (see J.H. Moore, Agency costs, technical change and Soviet 
central planning, Journal of Economics and Law, Vol. XXIV(2), October 
1981). However, there is no evidence to suggest that relative status 
and privilege and other aspects of power would always be maximised 
regardless of cost in terms of the absolute level of power and material 
consumption, which is what is needed to substantiate Orwell's approach. 
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complex choice and to deliver the desired combination of intensity and 
certainty of power. It must be a very frightened oligarchy that worries 
exclusively about its own reproduction without paying any attention to 
the. power level that is being reproduced. And a frightened oligarchy 
cannot be paranoid for ever: either it has reason to be frightened and 
tumbles, or it has not, and it will eventually learn to seek objectives 
other than the certainty of its longterm survival. Efficiency in a 
conventional Paretian sense then becomes important, and the envisaged 
system ceases to make sense; the WHY question remains unanswered. 
A three-players game. From the discussion of super-state Oceania 
Orwell passes quickly to extend his propositions to a world of three 
super-states almost indistinguishable in their institutions, economic 
structure, self-sufficiency, and each powerful enough to be individually 
invincible. Yet these are very strong and crucial assumptions, and the 
model is not robust enough to survive without them. If, contrary to 
Orwell's strict assumptions, two super-states can together subjugate or 
destroy the other, conventional e~~iciency beco~es crucial to super-
state survival, and the three players game will lend itself to a broader 
range of solutions other than the simple succession of alternate alliances 
and ·enmities envisaged by Orwell. If the super-states have different insti-
tutions (hastily ruled out by means of a now discredited "convergence" 
hypothesis) or different preferences between intensity and certainty of 
power, or are potentially complementary, the blind logic of repeated warfare 
for surplus destruction and for the reproduction of inequality does not 
follow necessarily at all. The new solution might involve better material 
conditions, or a better chance of a change, for agents other than the 
oligarchy itself; while the choice of alternative strategies also opens 
the possibility of mistakes and miscalculations; in this way the "system" 
can lose some of its grip on its subjects. 
Informational inefficiency. The systematic destruction of wealth 
for the preservation of social order is inefficient both with respect 
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to the achievement of alternative objectives and with respect to possible 
cheaper ways (such as unemployment, for instance) of preserving social 
order at the expense of wealth. Thus there is no need of dwelling over 
the sy~tem's inefficiency. But there is, in particular, a striking 
informational inefficiency in Orwell's system, that makes it vulnerable 
and possibly unviable. One can understand the rulers' wish to remould 
the past, conceal and distort information, as long as someone, somewhere, 
can store and retrieve correct information for the use of decision-makers. 
This, however, would both be less dramatic in literary terms (because 
trivially close to existing real practice) and reduce the safety of the 
system, because rebe.ls might gain access to correct information and use 
it against the system. Thus Orwell pictures a world in which not even 
Big Brother knows or cares about what really happens. But without this 
knowledge, control unavoidably slips. 
Technical regress. Whenever there is a permanent shift in relative 
input price, best practice techniques usually change and old techniques 
may be forgotten without loss or regr~t; for this. kind of forgetfulness 
to lead actually to technical regress it is necessary that the original 
shift be unexpectedly and permanently reversed. This is not what is 
envisaged in Orwell's approach to technology, thus the regress which is 
said to take place (except in the privileged sector of police and warfare 
techniques) has no conceivable explanation. 
Technological gap. The three superstates are depicted as totally 
insulated from one another, without communications, migrations, financial 
or commercial links. Yet, especially in warfare techniques, research goes 
on. There is no mechanism, in Orwell, preventing the appearance of a techno-
logical gap in war technology, upsetting the relatively harmless continued 
warfare which is a fund~ental pillar (the other being colle·ctivism) of 
Inner Party oligarchs. Nor is there a way of preventing technical spillover 
from military to civilian uses, reversing technical regress even if it could 
occur. 
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Firms and farms. Economists know, and knew long before Orwell 
wrote, that the complex tasks of running a large centrally-planned 
eco.nomy can only be managed with some degree of decentralisation, of 
information flows if not of decision power as well, to the level of 
sectors, or groups of firms, or firms and plants. Here Orwell is 
completely silent. Yet a multilevel decisional structure opens problems 
of decisional incentives and responsibility, of access to reliable 
information, of workers' participation in the process, as well as 
solutions which would be very much at odds with Orwell's implicit 
monolithic centralised structure which collects and processes infor-
mation and dispatches orders; the politics of alternative allocational 
models might also differ. Two side problems also arise here: without 
real intercommunications between one part of Oceania and the other, 
connections between firms delivering their output to each other must be 
centralised along vertical lines, instead of being direct, possibly 
pushing the centralisation level and local autarky, beyond reason. 
Also, the specific problems of agr.~cultural production, and of feeding 
the towns, have been left aside but would have to be a constant worry 
even for the most careless Big Brother. 
Outer Party members' preferences and incentives. While Inner Party 
members have all they need and proles do not know they need it (and have 
compensations), Outer Party members are both knowing and unprovided for, 
as well as having awkward limitations of their political and economic 
freedom (compulsory telescreen, no access to black market goods, etc.). 
Yet they are the backbone of Party executives; in view of their miserable 
lot they cannot be regarded as full members of the ruling oligarchy; 
their career prospects are low; they have no incentives. Does anything 
prevent their voluntary demotion to proles, other than cultural indoctri-
nation into the' Party's unbound contempt for the proles ("The proles are 
not human beings", says Syme of the Research Department of Minitrue, 
1.5.50)? (A small incongruity also springs to mind: are the Inner Party 
members' white-jacketed servants, who know and see so much, also assimi-
lated to Inner Patty members, or are they Outer Party members?). 
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"The future lies in the Proles". In Nineteen eighty-four Orwell's 
love/hate relationship with the working class takes a clearcut turn. He 
occasionally may convey a hint of solidarity and hope for their libera-
tion - at any rate from Big Brother - at the beginning of the book ("If 
there is hope 9 ••••• , it lies in the proles", 1.7.64) or while debating 
the question with torturer O'Brien: "'Life will defeat you' ••• 'Then what 
is it, this principle that will defeat us?' 'I don't know. The spirit 
of Man'" (3.3.232). But the spirit of Man is immediately and irredeemably 
broken, soiled by degradation and betrayal. There can be no doubt that 
Orwell's final stance in the book is one of contempt not compassion for 
the proles (and man at large, for that matter), who are doomed beyond 
redemption: "If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping 
on a human face- for ever" (3.3.230), says O'Brien, and Winston Smith's 
feeble objections (no vitality ••• the spirit of Man) only add force to 
O'Brien's proposition. Are there less feeble objections? The first 
concerns the oligarchy's reliance on collectivism as the route to the 
legitimation of inequality; it is true that historically we find many 
instances of this, but when privilege .~s visible and resented and is not 
counterbalanced by attenuating circumstances (such as greater efficiency, 
or luck, being associated with greater inequality), the formal pretence 
of collectivisation is no safe protection for the ruling oligarchy. The 
second is Orwell's neglect of the economic and political consequences of 
full employment, in spite of working class progress in Britain following 
virtual full employment during and immediately after the war (though 
Orwell did not live to see the 1951 election, which also rejected some 
of the more Big-Brotherish features of English Socialism for some time 
to come). Finally, and most importantly, the Proles' unwillingness and 
inability to revolt is due to their being brutalised not by Big Brother 
but by Orwell himself. "Today there were fear, hatred and pain, but no 
dignity of emotion, no deep or complex sorrows" (1.3.31, emphasis /"" 
added). But why on earth should there be no dignity of emotion, anywhere 
to be found? Under the worst repression there is dignity of emotion not 
only in heroes, like Anna Frank, but also in common uneducated men like 
Solzhenitsyn's !van Denisovich (who in a stalinist camp takes pride in 
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the products of his forced labour and draws strength out of small 
blessings). There is no dignity of emotion in Nineteen eight-four 
simply because deus ex machina Orwell has fancied taking it away, at a 
stroke, because he felt like it. Which is perfectly good literary 
licence, but a poor and misleading foundation for serious speculation 
about the future of Man. There is still hope, for the Proles. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
An oligarchy that for some reason finds itself in power (for 
instance, as a result of the course of events described in Animal Farm) 
seeks to perpetuate itself as a quasi-hereditary closed group via 
collectivism (which covers up and perpetuates inequality) and permanent 
moderate warfare (to prevent both underconsumption and diffusion of 
wealth) between large uniform super-states that have all converged to 
the same system. Manipulation and falsification of information and 
secret police rule are subsidiary ~nstruments .of government by privi-
leged Inner and Outer Party members over proletarians and forced labour. 
There is no trade, the system languishes and stagnates but successfully 
reproduces its own social order. 
This alleged vision is no feat of the imagination. It is a collage 
of recognisable components belonging to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia 
(always mentioned together, 3.2.218; 3.3.227) as well as English Labour 
and wartime England, possibly more perceptively understood by Orwell 
than other contemporaries of his, but not invented by him. Moreover, 
the whole does not hang together. The ultimate purpose of the system -
power - is crude and not the same thing as what the system obtains (i.e. 
stable relative inequality). The super-states wi~l behave as envisaged, 
as fairly coopefative enemies, only in quite special cases, otherwise 
their equilibrium is unstable. The system is technically and informatio-
nally inefficient. Orwell's summary and perfunctory dealing with techno-
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logy and its trends neglects the possibility of an international techno-
logy gap, and relies on an implausible course of technical regress. The 
microeconomic foundations of the system are grossly neglected, both for 
firms and individual agents (especially Outer Party members and Proles). 
The conviction, formulated by Orwell and conveyed to the reader, that 
proletarians will not resist oligarchic collectivism is based on the 
unjustified identification of collectivism and socialisation, on the 
neglect of the political and economic consequences of full employment of 
labour, and on Orwell's dehumanisation of the working class for the 
purpose of literary effect. 
Orwell's Nineteen eighty-four may or may not be a successful 
literary achievement. Certainly here Orwell does not reach the subtlety 
of Burgess's horror show Proles in Clockwork Orange, or the anguish of 
Kafka's despotism in Castle, or Trial, or Solzhenitsyn's Day in the 
Life, or Gulag, or Zinoviev's Yawning Heights, or even Ian Fleming's 
purposeful and entertaining violence. Orwell's oligarchic collectivism 
may or may not be a viable and credibl~ political .system; though since 
his book was published anticipations (already mentioned) are matched by 
strong counter-examples (internationalisation of production; Prague 
spring and Paris May of 1968; the Polish August of 1980; computer based 
decentralisation, to name a few). But as an economic system oligarchic 
collectivism does not stand the strain of close scrutiny. 
Orwell's Nineteen eight-four gives voice to Orwell's own and 
vicarious deepest fears and complexes, of a kind better treated by 
analysts than by social scientists: from impotence (" ••• her youth and 
prettiness had frightened him ••• 'Never mind, dear. There is no hurry"', 
2.2.107) to frigidity (Winston's wife Katherine "would lie there with 
shut eyes, neither resisting nor cooperating, but submitting", 1.6.62); 
~~ 
from loss of virginity (" ••• scores of times she had done it; he wished 
it had been hundred- thousands", 2.2.111) to vagina dentata ("She had 
no teeth at all", 1.6.63); from betrayal ("She betrayed you, Winston. 
Immediately - unreservedly" 3.2.223) to paralysis ("You have a vivid 
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mental picture of the vertebrae snapping apart and the spinal fluid 
dripping out of them", 3.2.271); from incest ('"Why', she added senti-
mentally, 'I might be your mother'. She might, thought Winston, be his 
mother", 3.1.197), to homosexual masochism(" ... he clung to O'Brien 
like a baby, curiously comforted by the heavy arm round his shoulder. 
He had the feeling that O'Brien was his protector ••• ", 3.2.216); from 
venereal disease ("If he could have infected the whole lot of them with 
leprosy or syphylis how gladly he would have done so", 2.2.111) to fear 
of rats ("They are enormous rats ... they will leap onto your face and 
bore straight into it", 3.5.246). 
By the same token, and in the same breath, Orwell articulates in 
the same unconnected fashion the fears and complexes that a society as a 
whole might have (or a man qua citizen rather than qua individual) : 
poverty, social injustice, ignorance, hunger, disappointment, waste, 
stagnation, relative deprivation, uncertainty, torture and war. This 
does not mean that a society, let alone all societies, will necessarily 
or even probably conform to a model where all .these social evils are 
present- any more than Orwell's powerful description of individual 
fears and complexes implies that a typical individual must have all of 
them at the same time all the time. As long as we keep in mind the 
distinction between fiction and science, no problem arises. The trouble 
is that Orwell himself did not like this distinction and did not make it 
in general or with reference with this book, nor usually do his readers. 
Indeed Orwell's ambition was to turn political writing into an art form. 
Even granting some artistic licence, Nineteen eighty-four and oligarchic 
collectivism are an angry gut reaction to a collection of things which 
Orwell did not like in the world at large that he knew rather than in a 
single actualylace or idealised system, let alone in the future of Man: 
Orwell's gutthink unsystem doubleplusunsense. 
Ecodep - Euruninst, 
Florence, April 1984. 
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